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Abstract
On July 1, 2015, Kathryn Steinle was fatally shot on San Francisco’s Embarcadero. The
killing was by the hands of Juan Francisco Lopez- Sanchez, an illegal alien convicted of multiple
felonies, who had already been deported from the United States on five different occasions
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INTRODUCTION

On July 1, 2015, Kathryn Steinle was fatally shot on San Francisco’s
Embarcadero.1 The killing was by the hands of Juan Francisco LopezSanchez, an illegal alien convicted of multiple felonies, who had already
been deported from the United States on five different occasions.2 The
murder only added fuel to the fire of the immigration debate, shifting the
general public’s attention to immigration policies and enforcement.3 The
main object of discussion has since been sanctuary jurisdictions—and
sanctuary policies in general.4 An obscure object to most, sanctuary policies
define the relationship between states and local jurisdictions and the federal
government with regards to immigrant residents.5 Specifically, sanctuary
policies often limit cooperation with federal immigration enforcement
actions and are implemented by many of the largest cities in the country.6
However, perception of sanctuary policies varies among different sides of the
political spectrum.7 While some believe sanctuary policies foster criminal
*
Davide Macelloni received his B.A., summa cum laude, in Political
Science from Florida Atlantic University in 2014 and is a J.D. Candidate for May 2018 at
Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad College of Law. The author would like to
thank his wife, Jocelyne, for her unwavering support and unconditional love. He would also
like to thank his parents, Marcello and Giovanna, his sister, Laura, and his grandfather,
Claudio, for always believing in him and encouraging him, even from thousands of miles
away. The author also thanks his fellow associates and board members of the Nova Law
Review for their dedication to this Comment. Lastly, he dedicates this Comment to his
birthplace, Rome, Caput Mundi.
1.
Christina Littlefield, Sanctuary Cities: How Kathryn Steinle’s Death
Intensified the Immigration Debate, L.A. TIMES (July 24, 2015, 5:10 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-immigration-sanctuary-kathryn-steinle20150723-htmlstory.html.
2.
Julia Preston, Murder Case Exposes Lapses in Immigration Enforcement,
N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2015, at A10; David Bier, Kate Steinle and San Francisco’s “Sanctuary
City” Policy, CATO INST.: CATO LIBERTY (Apr. 27, 2017, 4:54 PM),
http://www.cato.org/blog/kate-steinle-san-franciscos-sanctuary-city-policy.
3.
See Jerry Markon, California Killing Inflames Debate on Illegal
Immigrants,
‘Sanctuary
Cities’,
WASH.
POST:
POL.
(July
6,
2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/calif-killing-inflames-debate-on-illegal-immigrantssanctuary-cities/2015/07/06/8dc6eb50-241e-11e5-b72c-2b7d516e1e0e_story.html.
4.
See Tal Kopan, What Are Sanctuary Cities, and Can They Be Defunded?,
CNN: POL. (Jan. 25, 2017, 5:09 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/25/politics/sanctuarycities-explained/index.html; Littlefield, supra note 1; Janell Ross, 6 Big Things to Know About
Sanctuary Cities, WASH. POST: FIX (July 8, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2015/07/08/4-big-things-to-know-about-sanctuary-cities-and-illegal-immigration/.
5.
See Kopan, supra note 4.
6.
Id.
7.
See Loren Collingwood et al., Sanctuary Cities Do Not Experience an
Increase
in
Crime,
WASH.
POST:
MONKEY
CAGE
(Oct.
3,
2016),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/03/sanctuary-cities-do-not-
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activities and hot-beds for gang violence and drug-trafficking, others affirm
the exact opposite, claiming sanctuary jurisdictions to be safer and more
cooperative with law enforcement.8 The Executive Branch of the federal
government interprets the issue in agreement with the former position.9
On January 25, 2017, the newly elected President of the United
States, Donald J. Trump, signed Executive Order 13768 titled “Enhancing
Public Safety in the Interior of the United States” (“Executive Order”).10
The Executive Order targets sanctuary jurisdictions in an attempt to foster
cooperation between federal and state law enforcement agencies in the fight
against illegal immigration.11 Sanctuary jurisdictions have in fact been
accused by the White House of defying United States Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) orders.12 The Executive Order specifically
targets violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which forbids restrictions on the
sharing of information regarding citizenship or immigration status of
individuals with ICE.13
Advocates of the Executive Order argue that implementation of its
policies would improve the safety of citizens throughout the United States
and further allow a more efficient execution of federal laws and statutes
regarding immigration.14 Critics, on the other hand, argue that the Executive
Order infringes upon constitutional rights of state and local jurisdictions by
exercising powers—not constitutionally granted to the Executive Branch of
government—in violation of the fundamental principle of separation of

experience-an-increase-in-crime/; William Lajeunesse, Sessions Says When Cities Protect
Illegal Immigrants, ‘Criminals Take Notice’, FOX NEWS: POL. (July 12, 2017),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/07/12/sessions-says-when-cities-protect-illegalimmigrants-criminals-take-notice.html.
8.
See Michelangelo Landgrave & Alex Nowrasteh, Criminal Immigrants:
Their Numbers, Demographics, and Countries of Origin, 2017 CATO INST.: IMMIGR. RES. &
POL. BRIEF 1–2; Lajeunesse, supra note 7.
9.
See Tami Luhby, Trump Condemns Sanctuary Cities, but What Are They?,
CNN: POL. (Sept. 1, 2016, 10:08 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/01/politics/sanctuarycities-donald-trump/.
10.
Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8799, 8803 (Jan. 25, 2017).
11.
See id. at 8799.
12.
See Michelle Ye Hee Lee, The White House’s Claim That ‘Sanctuary’
Cities Are Violating the Law, WASH. POST: FACT CHECKER (April 28, 2017),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/04/28/the-white-houses-claimthat-sanctuary-cities-are-violating-the-law/.
13.
8 U.S.C. § 1373 (1996); Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8801.
14.
See Tal Kopan, House Passes ‘Kate’s Law’ and Bill Declaring War on
Sanctuary
Cities,
CNN:
POL.
(June
29,
2017,
6:30
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/29/politics/kates-law-sanctuary-cities-house-billimmigration/index.html.
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powers.15 Critics, in fact, affirm that ordering Congress to withhold federal
funding, one aspect of the Executive Order, as punishment for the failure to
comply with federal immigration laws, is an unconstitutional form of
coercion in violation of the Tenth Amendment—which prohibits the federal
government from forcing states and local governments to enforce federal
laws.16
Jurisdictions across the country have responded differently to
President Trump’s Executive Order: Cities like Los Angeles and New York
promised to stand behind their sanctuary policies, while Miami-Dade County
retracted its sanctuary policy.17
Part II of this Comment will illustrate the historical development of
sanctuary jurisdictions from their biblical origin to the most recent
application in the western legal system, specifically in the United States.18
Part III introduces the language of the Executive Order and its connections to
the statute that it is designed to enforce.19 Part IV analyzes, in depth, the
possible constitutional challenges to the Executive Order, and the arguments
both in favor and against its constitutionality.20 Finally, Part V of this
Comment will consider the possible repercussions of the provisions within
the Executive Order in Florida, with particular attention paid to the South
Florida region, historically home to thousands of immigrants.21
II.
A.

SANCTUARY JURISDICTIONS

Historical Development: From Its Biblical Origin . . .

The concept of a sanctuary dates back to at least biblical times, and
was originally rooted in the power of religious authorities to grant protection
within an inviolable religious area or structure to persons fearing for their

15.
See Devin Watkins, 5 Ways Trump’s Anti-Sanctuary City Orders Are
Unconstitutional, TIME: LAW (Mar. 31, 2017), http://www.time.com/4720749/trumpsanctuary-cities-unconstitutional/.
16.
Id.; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
17.
See Henry Goldman, Sanctuary-City Mayors Vow to Defy Trump After He
Threatens
Funding,
BLOOMBERG:
POL.
(Jan.
26,
2017,
8:00
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-26/trump-threat-to-deny-funds-drawsdefiance-from-sanctuary-cities. But see Ray Sanchez et al., Florida’s Largest County to
Comply with Trump’s Sanctuary Crackdown, CNN: POL. (Jan. 27, 2017, 6:34 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/27/politics/miami-dade-mayor-sanctuarycrackdown/index.html.
18.
See infra Part II.
19.
See infra Part III.
20.
See infra Part IV.
21.
See infra Part V.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol42/iss1/5

4

Macelloni: A Violation Of The Anti-Commandeering Principle And Spending Powe

2017]

A VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-COMMANDEERING PRINCIPLE

99

lives or liberty.22 Sanctuary practices existed in many Western societies, and
were extensively used by ancient Hebrews after being freed from slavery in
Egypt.23 Sanctuary practices were further used in both ancient Greece and
Rome, with characteristics similar to the concept of asylum.24
While originally granting asylum for all crimes, with many temples
extending what was considered as divine protection, Greeks later reduced the
use of asylum to individuals who had committed unpremeditated crimes. 25
Contrarily, sacred edifices in Rome were not sanctuaries.26 In fact, Romans
only extended asylum to give immunity and protection from violence
throughout the inquisition process.27 Once judgment on the evidence was
rendered, the asylum would be revoked and punishment would be inflicted
on the defendant found guilty of a crime.28 With the emergence of
Christianity, the concept of sanctuary extended to a wider range of
individuals.29 In 303 A.D., Constantine’s Edict of Toleration granted
Christian churches permission to extend protection to fugitives.30 Sanctuary
was later recognized as a legal right through the promulgation of the
Theodosian Code by the emperor Theodosius in 392 A.D.31 Extensively
used in medieval times—enjoying recognition in both Canon law and Saxon
law—sanctuaries suffered as centralized governments increased throughout
Europe, and Church and State clashed over its control.32 Resulting from the

22.
Michael J. Davidson, Sanctuary: A Modern Legal Anachronism, 42 CAP.
U. L. REV. 583, 609 (2014); see also ANN CRITTENDEN, SANCTUARY 62 (1988); Michael Scott
Feeley, Towards the Cathedral: Ancient Sanctuary Represented in the American Context, 27
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 801, 802 (1990). “Sanctuary is the power of guardians of a defined
religious site to grant protections to one who seeks safety out of fear of life or limb.” Feeley,
supra at 802. Most ancient cultures, including Syrians and Phoenicians developed sanctuary
towns and temples. William C. Ryan, The Historical Case for the Right of Sanctuary, 29 J.
CHURCH & ST. 209, 211, 211 n.20 (1987).
23.
Ryan, supra note 22, at 211.
24.
See Jorge L. Carro, Sanctuary: The Resurgence of an Age-Old Right or a
Dangerous Misinterpretation of an Abandoned Ancient Privilege?, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 747,
751 (1986) (analyzing the “[n]on-[b]iblical [o]rigins of [w]estern [s]anctuar[ies]”).
25.
Id. (affirming that sanctuary would also be extended to a person “in
danger of cruel and summary vengeance”).
26.
Ryan, supra note 22, at 213–14.
27.
Carro, supra note 24, at 751.
28.
See id.
29.
Id. at 752.
30.
Davidson, supra note 22, at 587.
31.
Carro, supra note 24, at 752.
32.
Feeley, supra note 22, at 810; see also Ryan, supra note 22, at 216–18
(discussing in depth the rise of the sanctuary privilege in Anglo-Saxon society and its
development in English common law).
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schism between the English Crown and the Catholic Church, the privilege of
sanctuary came to an end in England in 1624.33
B.

. . . To Its Modern American Application . . .

In the United States, sanctuaries by religious authorities against civil
authorities were not invoked for almost 200 years.34 Prior to the American
Civil War, clergymen and members of religious communities offered aid to
slaves escaping bondage through an intricate system of routes known as the
Underground Railroad.35 Although activism in the Underground Railroad
was spread across religious figures and churches, no record exists of any
church invoking the right to sanctuary.36 The first instance of the modern
application of sanctuaries was during the Vietnam War, a military action that
was strongly opposed by the religious community, which offered safe havens
to draftees conscientiously resisting the draft.37 Although participants to the
movement made no claim asserting legal recognition, the renewed concept of
sanctuary was empowered by its characteristics of civil disobedience.38
The current sanctuary movement in the United States developed in
the 1980s when, after the enactment of the Refugee Act, “thousands of
immigrants from El Salvador and Guatemala” applied for asylum.39 As a
consequence of asylum applications being routinely rejected by federal
33.
Davidson, supra note 22, at 593; Feeley, supra note 22, at 810.
34.
IGNATIUS BAU, THIS GROUND IS HOLY: CHURCH SANCTUARY AND
CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEES 160 (1985); Davidson, supra note 22, at 594. Early colonial
history of the United States makes no mention of sanctuary privileges. BAU, supra at 159.
The inexistence of sanctuary privileges in the United States at the time was probably due to
the fact that pilgrims considered America as a sanctuary in its entirety, and therefore saw no
reason to formally adopt the privilege. Id. at 158–59; James H. Walsh & Mary Ellen O’Neill,
Sanctuary - A Legal Privilege or Act of Civil Disobedience?, FLA. B.J., Feb. 1987, at 11, 13.
35.
Davidson, supra note 22, at 594–95; see also Kathleen L. Villarruel, Note,
The Underground Railroad and the Sanctuary Movement: A Comparison of History,
Litigation, and Values, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1429, 1436, 1440–41 (1987) (drawing a thorough
comparison between the Underground Railroad movement of the 1840s and 1850s to the
sanctuary movement).
36.
Davidson, supra note 22, at 595.
37.
Id. at 597–98.
38.
Walsh & O’Neill, supra note 34, at 14.
39.
Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a “Sanctuary”?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133, 139
(2008); see also Douglas L. Colbert, The Motion in Limine: Trial Without Jury—A
Government’s Weapon Against the Sanctuary Movement, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 5, 30–31
(1986). The two groundbreaking events igniting the civil war in El Salvador were the
assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero of San Salvador, murdered while saying mass, and
the rape and murder of four American Catholic missionaries by National guardsmen. Colbert,
supra at 30–31 (explaining the unfolding of the sanctuary movement on behalf of Central
American immigrants in the United States).
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agencies, many churches across the country declared themselves sanctuaries
to offer refuge to immigrants and protest against the policies of the federal
government.40 In March of 1982, the Southside Presbyterian Church of
Tucson, Arizona, was the first to publicly announce itself as a sanctuary for
Central American immigrants fleeing war.41 In addition to offering
protection, the churches and religious communities involved in the
movement provided food, clothing, and legal services.42
Following the wave of sanctuary initiatives ignited by churches and
religious groups around the country, many local governments established
sanctuary policies.43 Sanctuary laws passed by cities and states generally
declared public places as sanctuaries.44 Jurisdictions that passed sanctuary
laws during the 1980s included cities—Seattle, Los Angeles, Minneapolis,
Chicago, Rochester—and states, including New Mexico, New York, and
Massachusetts.45
C.

. . . And Its Contemporary Version

Dissipating at the same pace as the political turmoil in Central
America, the sanctuary movement regained momentum in the wake of the
attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001.46 A few months
40.
Villarruel, supra note 35, at 1433; see also Feeley, supra note 22, at 820.
41.
Davidson, supra note 22, at 603.
42.
Villazor, supra note 39, at 141.
43.
Jennifer L. Gregorin, Comment, Hidden Beneath the Waves of
Immigration Debate: San Francisco’s Sanctuary Ordinance, 6 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 175, 182
(2011).
44.
Villazor, supra note 39, at 142 (affirming that laws were indicative of
political stands against federal immigration policies regarding the Central American crisis);
Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the Federal
Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1383 (2006) (stating that local governments
passed sanctuary laws allowing asylum-seekers to remain within their jurisdictions’
boundaries without threat of arrest for violation of federal immigration laws by local law
enforcement).
45.
Pham, supra note 44, at 1383; see also Jorge L. Carro, Municipal and
State Sanctuary Declarations: Innocuous Symbolism or Improper Dictates?, 16 PEPP. L. REV.
297, 311–12 n.88–97 (1989) (describing the extended implementation of sanctuary policies
across the country and listing, among others, Oakland, San Francisco, San Jose, and
Sacramento, California; Rochester and Ithaca, New York; and Cambridge, Massachusetts as
municipalities which also passed resolutions or city ordinances in favor of sanctuaries); Daniel
D. McMillan, Note, City Sanctuary Resolutions and the Preemption Doctrine: Much Ado
About Nothing, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 513, 516–17 (1987) (affirming that the cities of
Berkeley, California, and Madison, Wisconsin, also passed resolutions establishing
themselves as “cities of refuge for Central American refugees”).
46.
Laura Sullivan, Comment, Enforcing Nonenforcement: Countering the
Threat Posed to Sanctuary Laws by the Inclusion of Immigration Records in the National
Crime Information Center Database, 97 CAL. L. REV. 567, 572 (2009).
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after the attack, answering concerns of the general public regarding national
security and immigration, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) released a
memorandum announcing the inherent authority of local officials to arrest
and detain illegal immigrants for both civil immigration and criminal
violations.47 Disapproving the policies set forth by the memorandum, local
enforcement authorities adopted new sanctuary policies.48 The trend of
implementing favorable sanctuary policies has grown steadily since then,
albeit the heinous crime committed against innocent civilians in New York
on September 11, 2001 would have warranted otherwise.49 By 2008, many
states throughout the country counted sanctuary jurisdictions within their
territorial boundaries.50
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) responded to local
jurisdictions’ implementation of sanctuary policies by creating “Secure
Communities, [a program requiring] local law enforcement agencies to run
fingerprints through the DHS illegal immigrant database upon booking.”51
When a match occurred, ICE would be alerted and a detainer would be
issued.52 DHS discontinued the program in 2014 due to complications in its
administration arising out of lawsuits for violation of arrestees’ Fourth
Amendment rights.53 DHS substituted Secure Communities with the Priority
Enforcement Program (“PEP”), a program designed to limit the applicability
47.
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, on Non-Preemption of the Authority of State and Local Law Enforcement Officials to
Arrest Aliens for Immigration Violations 35 (Apr. 3, 2002) (on file with the U.S. Dep’t of
Justice).
48.
Sullivan, supra note 46, at 573; see also Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws
in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws
Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 966–67 (2004).
49.
Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to
Call the Police, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1455 (2006); see also Kris W. Kobach, The
Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police to Make Immigration
Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 184 (2005). Four different members of the terrorist commando
responsible for the attacks on the World Trade Center on 9/11—Nawaf al Hazmi, Mohammed
Atta, Hani Hanjour, and Ziad Jarrah—had previously violated federal immigration laws, but
state or local law enforcement failed to detain them. Kobach, supra at 184–87.
50.
See Gregorin, supra note 43, at 183; NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR.,
LAWS, RESOLUTIONS AND POLICIES INSTITUTED ACROSS THE U.S. LIMITING ENFORCEMENT OF
IMMIGRATION LAWS BY STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES 2–7, 9 (2008).
51.
See Bridget Stubblefield, Note, Development in the Executive Branch
Sanctuary Cities: Balancing Between National Security Directives, Local Law Enforcement
Autonomy, and Immigrants’ Rights, 29 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 541, 542 (2015); Secure
Communities, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.ice.gov/secure-communities (last
updated May 19, 2017).
52.
Stubblefield, supra note 51, at 543; see also Barbara E. Armacost,
“Sanctuary” Laws: The New Immigration Federalism, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1197, 1209
(2016).
53.
See Stubblefield, supra note 51, at 543.
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of detainers merely to illegal immigrants convicted of a civil immigration
priority offense[].54
The implementation of federal immigration detention mandated by
ICE did not produce the results hoped for, leading cities across the country to
once again implement counter-policies in opposition to the federal
Currently, approximately 400 local
immigration regulations.55
jurisdictions—with New York, San Francisco, and Los Angeles once again
at the forefront of the movement—refuse to comply with federal immigration
mandates and, either officially or unofficially, refuse to apply sanctuary
regulations within their territories.56
Modern sanctuaries do not conceal undocumented aliens nor shelter
them from detection.57 “[W]hen a city says that it is being a sanctuary, it
means that the city will not be an arm of federal immigration authorities.” 58
The lack of intent to physically protect individuals from law enforcement is
what specifically separates modern sanctuaries from the original
movement.59 In an interview released to Politico, the director of special
projects at the New York Immigration Coalition contended that “the term
sanctuary cities is a misnomer.”60 Shifting substantially from their historical
meaning, nowadays sanctuary jurisdictions are considered to be cities,
counties, or states, which limit government employees—specifically local
law enforcement—from inquiring about the immigration status of
immigrants they encounter; with an exception recognized for cases of serious
criminal offense[s].61
54.
Id.
55.
See id. at 542–43.
56.
See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 4, City & Cty. of
S.F. v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 31, 2017); Erwin Chemerinsky,
The Constitutionality of Withholding Federal Funds from Sanctuary Cities, L.A. LAW., Apr.
2017, at 60, 60; Liz Robbins, Angry Mayors Vow to Defy Trump Immigration Order, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 26, 2017, at A.17; Ohio Jobs & Justice PAC, The Original List of Sanctuary
Cities, USA, OJJPAC, http://www.ojjpac.org/sanctuary.asp (last updated July 29, 2017).
57.
Chemerinsky, supra note 56, at 60.
58.
Id.
59.
See id.; Villazor, supra note 39, at 148–49.
60.
Gloria Pazmino et al., Few Guarantees as Local Governments Plot
‘Sanctuary’
Policy,
POLITICO:
CAL.
(Mar.
27,
2017,
5:16
AM),
http://www.politico.com/states/california/story/2017/03/with-sanctuary-cities-in-trumpscrosshairs-local-governments-craft-a-response-110692.
“For people that are anti-immigrant, sanctuary cities are places where anyone can
come and commit a crime and there is no law and order, and we know that is
fiction” . . . . “At the same time, sanctuary cities are not places where we can stop
the federal government from entering and using information they have access to.

Id.
61.
Corrie Bilke, Note, Divided We Stand, United We Fall: A Public Policy
Analysis of Sanctuary Cities’ Role in the “Illegal Immigration” Debate, 42 IND. L. REV. 165,
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Although scholars and local policymakers have traditionally divided
modern sanctuary policies into three major categories, such categories are
often times combined by jurisdictions within one regulation.62 The first
category, the so-called don’t ask policies, limits inquiries as to the nationality
or immigration status of an individual by local law enforcement.63 The
second category, don’t enforce policies, creates limitations on the power of
local law enforcement to arrest or detain violators of immigration laws.64
Don’t tell regulations, the third category, establishes limitations on the
authority by local enforcement agents to report immigration status
information to federal agencies.65
States and municipalities, as well as individual police departments,
have adopted diverse mechanisms to ensure that unauthorized aliens in their
jurisdictions are not turned over to federal immigration authorities.66 For
instance, Cook County, Illinois, home to Chicago, instructs its county jail
system to deny compliance with ICE detainer requests;67 Los Angeles’
Special Order 40, the oldest city sanctuary ordinance, refrains police action
for the mere purpose of determining a person’s immigration status;68 and San

180 (2009) (discussing the historical development of sanctuary cities in the United States and
the potential hazards that nonfederal enforcement of immigration law that sanctuary cities
seek to avert); Villazor, supra note 39, at 147–48 (examining the narrower scope of the
definition of sanctuary cities compared to its original meaning).
62.
Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1455; see also Sullivan, supra note 46, at 574.
63.
Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1455.
64.
Id.; see also Pham, supra note 44, at 1390 (dividing don’t enforce
provisions between “[n]o [e]nforcement of [i]mmigration [l]aws”—often reducing the
resources available to officers to enforce federal immigration laws—and “[n]o [e]nforcement
of [c]ivil [i]mmigration [l]aws”—barring cooperation in immigration law enforcement when
the alleged violation is exclusively a civil violation).
65.
Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1455.
66.
LISA M. SEGHETTI ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32270, ENFORCING
IMMIGRATION LAW: THE ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 26 (2006).
67.
See Paul Bedard, ICE Chief Lists Worst Sanctuary Cities: Chicago, NYC,
San Francisco, Philadelphia, WASH. EXAMINER (July 24, 2017, 7:27 AM),
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/ice-chief-lists-worst-sanctuary-cities-chicago-nyc-sanfrancisco-philadelphia/article/2629466.
68.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE, SPECIAL ORDER NO. 40, UNDOCUMENTED
ALIENS (1979); Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1469. Los Angeles was one of the first cities in the
United States to promote sanctuary policies. Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1455. The Office of the
Los Angeles Chief of Police promulgated Special Order 40 to stop local enforcement agents
from initiating police action with the sole purpose of discovering the immigration status of a
person. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE, supra. The Order, however, allowed officers to
communicate to federal agencies arrest records when the person arrested had been previously
convicted of a felony. Id.
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Francisco Sheriff’s Department’s policy is that, absent a court issued warrant
or signed order, contact with ICE representatives should be limited.69
III.

PRESIDENTIAL PROMISE

Since officially entering the presidential race in June of 2015,
President Trump focused his campaign leitmotif on issues of public safety
and threats presented by illegal immigration.70 On several occasions during
his campaign, President Trump vowed to crack down on sanctuary
jurisdictions in an attempt to lower criminal rates and defeat criminal
organizations operating in the United States.71 Highly critical of the federal
immigration policies implemented by former President Barack H. Obama—
his predecessor at the presidential helm—President Trump identified
sanctuary policies as one of the main causes of the proliferation of criminal
organizations.72 Since his election, as the forty-fifth President of the United
States on November 8, 2016, President Trump’s position on immigration has
not changed.73 Faithful to his campaign promises to the electorate, on
January 25, 2017, exactly five days after taking the Oath of Office, President
Trump signed the Executive Order.74

69.
Letter from Ross Mirkarimi, Sheriff, S.F. Sheriff’s Dep’t, to All
Personnel, S.F. Sheriff’s Dep’t (Mar. 13, 2015) (on file with San Francisco Sheriff’s
Department).
70.
Jason Le Miere, Immigrants Are Not ‘Criminals, Drug Dealers and
Rapists,’ ICE Director Says, Contradicting Trump, NEWSWEEK: U.S. EDITION (June 28, 2017,
4:42 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/immigrants-mexico-rapists-ice-immigration-629866.
71.
Amita Kelly & Barbara Sprunt, Here Is What Donald Trump Wants to Do
in
His
First
100
Days,
NPR: POL.
(Nov.
9,
2016,
3:45
PM),
http://www.npr.org/2016/11/09/501451368/here-is-what-donald-trump-wants-to-do-in-hisfirst-100-days.
72.
Tami Luhby, Trump Condemns Sanctuary Cities, but What Are They?,
CNN: POL. (Sept. 1, 2016, 10:08 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/01/politics/sanctuarycities-donald-trump/; see also Jose A. DelReal, Trump Blames Obama for Orlando Shooting,
Blasts Clinton on Immigration, WASH. POST: POST POL. (June 13, 2016),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/06/13/trump-blames-obama-fororlando-shooting-blasts-clinton-on-immigration/.
73.
Priscilla Alvarez, Trump Cracks Down on Sanctuary Cities, ATLANTIC
(Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/trump-crack-downsanctuary-city/514427/; see also Dan Brekke, Trump: California ‘Out of Control’ and
Defunding Could Be in Store, KQED NEWS: CAL. REP. (Feb. 6, 2017, 11:50 AM),
http://ww2.kqed.org/news/2017/02/06/trump-california-out-of-control-and-defunding-couldbe-in-store/; Kelly & Sprunt, supra note 71. In his interview with Bill O’Reilly, President
Trump stated that defunding sanctuary cities would certainly be a weapon in the hands of the
federal government to ensure compliance with federal directives. Brekke, supra.
74.
Alvarez, supra note 73.

Published by NSUWorks, 2018

11

Nova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 5

106

A.

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States

Composed of eighteen sections, the Executive Order lays out the
presidential plan against illegal immigration.75 Specified in section one,
“[t]he purpose of [the Executive Order] is to direct executive departments
and agencies . . . to employ all lawful means to enforce immigration laws of
the United States.”76 Further, affirming that aliens illegally entering the
United States—and those aliens overstaying their visas—are a significant
threat to both public safety and national security, the Executive Order asserts
that faithful execution of federal immigration laws is impossible when
exemptions apply to different classes and categories of removable aliens.77
In a direct attack on sanctuary jurisdictions, section one also stresses that
“[s]anctuary jurisdictions across the United States willfully violate [f]ederal
law in an attempt to shield aliens from removal from the United States.
These jurisdictions have caused immeasurable harm to the American people
and to the very fabric of our Republic.”78
In an additional effort to equalize the categories of removable aliens,
section five of the Executive Order lists multiple classes of aliens that fulfill
the federal requirements for removal.79 In its language, the Executive Order
allows the Secretary of Homeland Security to prioritize for removal, in
addition to those recognized by congressional acts, aliens who:
a)
Have been convicted of any criminal offense;
b)
Have been charged with any criminal offense, where such
charge has not been resolved;
c)
Have committed acts that constitute a chargeable criminal
offense;
d)
Have engaged in fraud or willful misrepresentation in
connection with any official matter or application before a
governmental agency;
e)
Have abused any program related to receipt of public
benefits;
f)
Are subject to a final order of removal, but who have not
complied with their legal obligation to depart the United States; or
g)
In the judgment of an immigration officer, otherwise pose
80
a risk to public safety or national security.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8799–803 (Jan. 25, 2017).
Id. at 8799.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8800.
Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8800.
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In order to implement the policies laid out in the Executive Order, in
section eight, President Trump states that it is the intent of the Executive
Branch to empower law enforcement agencies at both the state and local
level to perform those functions generally employed by federal immigration
officers.81 Attempting to foster cooperation between federal, state, and local
agencies, the Executive Order further provides that the Secretary of State has
the authority to enter into statutorily regulated agreements with state
governors and local officials to permit local agencies to enforce federal
laws.82 However, in opposition to the constructive language of section eight,
the Executive Order provides punitive language in section nine for those
jurisdictions that fail to enforce federal immigration policies.83
B.

Section Nine—The Source of Discord

Section nine of the Executive Order is titled Sanctuary Jurisdictions,
and affirms that “[i]t is the policy of the [E]xecutive [B]ranch to ensure, to
the fullest extent of the law, that a [s]tate, or a political subdivision of a
[s]tate, shall comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373.”84 Specifically, subsection 9(a)
establishes that:
In furtherance of this policy, the Attorney General and the
Secretary, in their discretion and to the extent consistent with law,
shall ensure that jurisdictions that willfully refuse to comply with 8
U.S.C. § 1373—sanctuary jurisdictions—are not eligible to receive
[f]ederal grants, except as deemed necessary for law enforcement
purposes by the Attorney General or the Secretary. The Secretary
has the authority to designate, in his discretion and to the extent
consistent with law, a jurisdiction as a sanctuary jurisdiction. The
Attorney General shall take appropriate enforcement action against
any entity that violates 8 U.S.C. § 1373, or which has in effect a
statute, policy, or practice that prevents or hinders the enforcement
85
of [f]ederal law.

The stated goal of section 9(a) of the Executive Order is to take
enforcement actions against any entity or jurisdiction that fails to comply

81.
Id.
82.
Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012). In 8 U.S.C § 1357(g), this section
allows agreements between federal agencies and state or local agencies within the scope to
permit local law enforcement to enforce federal laws and regulations. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1)–
(2).
83.
See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8801.
84.
Id.
85.
Id.
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with federal law, specifically 8 U.S.C. § 1373. 86 Stated within the language
of section 9(a), and also confirmed by the language of section two, President
Trump’s objective is to ensure that jurisdictions not in compliance with
federal law do not receive federal funds and grants, with exceptions made for
disbursements mandated by law.87
C.

8 U.S.C. § 1373

Signed into law by President Bill Clinton in September of 1996—
just a few months after another statute with similar language, the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (“PRWORA”),
was signed into law—the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) contained the provision which was later
codified at Title 8 § 1373 of the United States Code.88 8 U.S.C. § 1373
regulates communications between government agencies, including federal,
state, and local agencies, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(“INS”).89 Specifically, the statute prohibits any federal, state, or local
government entity or official from restricting “any government entity or
official[s] from sending to, or receiving from, the [INS] information
regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any
individual.”90 The statutory language further prohibits any person or agency
86.
See id.
87.
See id. at 8799, 8801.
88.
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION REFORM & IMMIGRANT RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF
1996, H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 180 (1996) (Conf. Rep); Bill Ong Hing, Immigration
Sanctuary Policies: Constitutional and Representative of Good Policing and Good Public
Policy, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 247, 263–64, 294 (2012) (affirming the similarities between the
provision of the IIRIRA and the language of the PRWORA, better known as the Welfare
Reform Act, signed into law by President Clinton just a few weeks before the IIRIRA in
August 1996. Codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1644, the Welfare Reform Act contained a provision
regulating communications between state and local government and federal governmental
agencies in a manner similar to the IIRIRA). 8 U.S.C. § 1644 provides that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of [f]ederal, [s]tate, or local law,
no [s]tate or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way restricted,
from sending to or receiving from the Immigration and Naturalization Service
information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the
United States.

8 U.S.C. § 1644 (2012).
89.
8 U.S.C. § 1373 (1996).
90.
Id. § 1373(a). The Senate version of the bill noted in its report that the
section:
Prohibits any restriction on the exchange of information between the
[INS] and any [f]ederal, [s]tate, or local agency regarding a person’s immigration
status. . . . The acquisition, maintenance, and exchange of immigration-related
information by [s]tate and local agencies is consistent with, and potentially of
considerable assistance to, the [f]ederal regulation of immigration and the achieving
of the purposes and objectives of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
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to “prohibit, or in any way restrict a [f]ederal, [s]tate, or local government
entity from” sending, requesting, or receiving information regarding the
immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual from the INS;
maintaining such information; and exchanging information with other
government agencies.91 Although prohibiting restrictions on informationsharing between state and federal agencies, neither of these anti-sanctuary
statutes renders cooperation with federal immigration authorities—or sharing
of information—mandatory.92
As some scholars have noted, the
characteristic of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 is to encourage cooperation among
different levels of law enforcement by prohibiting certain conduct instead of
directly requiring local cooperation.93
IV.

CONSTITUTIONALITY ISSUES

The reaction from states and municipalities, to the signing of the
Executive Order, was strong and immediate.94 On January 31, 2017, the City
and County of San Francisco filed a suit in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California challenging the constitutionality of the
Executive Order.95 The County of Santa Clara, California filed suit shortly
thereafter on February 3, 2017, on similar grounds, seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief against all named defendants, which included President
Trump himself.96 The City of Richmond, California also filed suit
challenging the Executive Order on March 21, 2017, and on March 23, 2017,
moved to relate its case to the suits brought by the Counties of Santa Clara
and San Francisco.97 An additional action seeking declaratory and injunctive
Elizabeth M. McCormick, Federal Anti-Sanctuary Law: A Failed Approach to Immigration
Enforcement and a Poor Substitute for Real Reform, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 165, 177
(2016) (quoting IMMIGRATION CONTROL & FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1996, S. Rep.
No. 104-249, at 19–20 (1996)).
91.
8 U.S.C. § 1373(b) (1996).
92.
See McCormick, supra note 90, at 169.
93.
Rick Su, Police Discretion and Local Immigration Policymaking, 79
UMKC L. REV. 901, 911 (2011). The statute is enforceable exclusively against so-called
don’t tell policies, while it is silent on the other two major categories of sanctuary policies,
don’t enforce and don’t ask. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1373.
94.
See Michelle Mark, ‘Sanctuary Cities’ Are Ready to Fight Trump’s
Potentially ‘Unconstitutional’ Executive Order, BUS. INSIDER: POLITICS (Jan. 27, 2017, 10:09
AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/sanctuary-cities-brace-for-trumps-executive-order-onimmigration-2017-1.
95.
Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56, at 1–2.
Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 14, 4041, Cty. of
96.
Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00574-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 3, 2017).
97.
Administrative Motion of City of Richmond to Consider Whether Cases
Should Be Related Pursuant to Civil L.R. 3-12(B) & Notice of Related Case Pursuant to Civil
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relief was filed on February 8, 2017, by the City of Lawrence,
Massachusetts, and the City of Chelsea, Massachusetts, in the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts.98 The counties and cities
specifically challenged section 9(a), the enforcement provision within the
language of the Executive Order, on several grounds.99
In general, the cities and counties each argue that section 9(a) of the
Executive Order violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine by improperly
seeking to exercise congressional spending powers.100 In addition, even if
President Trump could exercise such spending powers, the cities and
counties contend that the Executive Order would be in violation of those
powers—and thereby unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment—and,
lastly, that section 9(a) violates the anti-commandeering clause of the Tenth
Amendment.101
On the other hand, support for the Executive Order—and the policies
and objectives stated therein—has come from Patrick Morrissey, the
Attorney General of West Virginia, and Jeff Landry, the Attorney General of
Louisiana.102 In their amici curiae brief—filed in the action brought by the
Local Rule 3-13 at 12, City & Cty. of S.F. v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485-WHO (N.D. Cal.
filed Jan. 31, 2017) [hereinafter Administrative Motion]; see also Complaint for Injunctive &
Declaratory Relief Concerning Federal Executive Order 13768 at 3, 29, City of Richmond v.
Trump, 2017 WL 3605216 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2017) (No. 3:17-cv-01535-WHO). Cty. of
Santa Clara v. Trump and City & Cty. of S.F. v. Trump had already been consolidated in
February pursuant to an order issued by Judge William H. Orrick of the District Court for the
Northern District of California. See Order Granting the County of Santa Clara’s & City &
County of San Francisco’s Motions to Enjoin Section 9(a) of Executive Order 13768 at 29,
Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00574-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 3, 2017).
98.
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56,
at 2.
99.
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56,
at 15; Thomas Fuller, San Francisco Sues Trump over ‘Sanctuary Cities’ Order, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 2017, at A11; Maura Dolan & James Queally, Santa Clara County Seeks to Block
Trump’s Order to Defund Sanctuary Cities, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017, 2:25 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-santa-clara-sanctuary-trump-lawsuit-20170223story.html; see also Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017); Alison
Frankel, Cities Say Trump’s Sanctuary Policy Is Unconstitutional, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2017,
5:51 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-sanctuary-idUSKBN171361.
100.
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56,
at 1622; Frankel, supra note 99; see also Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8801.
101.
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56,
at 16; see also Frankel, supra note 99; Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8801.
102.
See Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae States of West Virginia, Louisiana,
Alabama, Arkansas, Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, & Texas at 1, 12,
Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00574-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 3, 2017)
[hereinafter Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae]. The Amici states supporting the Executive
Order also include the states of “Alabama, Arkansas, Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, and Texas.” Id. at 1 n.1.
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City and County of San Francisco and the County of Santa Clara—both
maintain that the Executive Order is constitutional and challenges the
validity of the action taken by these cities and counties based upon
justiciability grounds.103 Without going into the specific merits of whether
any of the plaintiffs have standing to bring the action, the following analysis
will focus on the constitutionality of the Executive Order, including possible
arguments in favor or against it.104
A.

Spending Clause

Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution establishes what
has been defined as the Taxing and Spending Clause.105 The Taxing and
Spending Clause textually affirms that “Congress shall have the Power To
lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States;
but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States.”106
Vast jurisprudence has interpreted the language of the Taxing and
Spending Clause, starting with United States v. Butler,107 which defines the
federal spending power broadly to promote the general welfare.108 The
103.
Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 102, at 2. The first argument
presented by the brief is the lack of standing to bring suit due to the absence of any injury to
the jurisdictions. Id.
104.
See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8799; Proposed Brief of
Amici Curiae, supra note 102, at 3; State of California’s Administrative Motion for Leave to
File an Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 2,
City & Cty. of S.F. v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 31, 2017)
[hereinafter State of California’s Administrative Motion].
105.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
106.
Id.; Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the
Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1111–12 (1987). The Founding Fathers disagreed on the
extent of the General Welfare Clause, with Alexander Hamilton and James Madison
expressing ideas at the opposite end of the spectrum. Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 34, at
178 (Alexander Hamilton) (American Bar Association ed., 2009), with THE FEDERALIST NO.
41, at 233–34 (James Madison) (American Bar Association ed., 2009). Alexander Hamilton
thought that additional power was provided by the General Welfare Clause to Congress
without limits imposed by other enumerated powers. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 34, supra.
Contrarily, James Madison interpreted the General Welfare Clause as confining Congress’
taxing and spending powers to those fields enumerated by the Constitution. See THE
FEDERALIST NO. 41, supra at 233–34.
107.
297 U.S. 1 (1936).
108.
Id. at 65–66. “[T]he power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public
money[] for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in
the Constitution.” Id. at 66 (adopting Alexander Hamilton’s interpretation of the General
Welfare Clause); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 34, supra note 106, at 177–78 (Alexander
Hamilton); Jeffrey T. Renz, What Spending Clause? (or the President’s Paramour): An
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Supreme Court of the United States further affirmed in South Dakota v.
Dole109 that “Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds,
and has repeatedly employed the power ‘to further broad policy objectives by
conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient
with federal statutory and administrative directives.’”110 Articulating
limitations to the applicable conditions, Chief Justice Rehnquist announced
in Dole a four-part test stemming from previous, singular rulings of the
Court.111 First, the use of spending power by Congress must be in
furtherance of the general welfare.112 Reaffirming the principle established
in Helvering v. Davis,113 the Chief Justice recognized that courts should
observe some degree of deference to Congress in determining “whether a
particular expenditure is intended to serve general public purposes.” 114
Second, conditions imposed by Congress on grants must be unambiguous.115
Third, there must be a relation between the conditions imposed by Congress

Examination of the Views of Hamilton, Madison, and Story on Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of
the United States Constitution, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 81, 103 (1999).
109.
483 U.S. 203 (1987).
110.
Id. at 206 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980)).
South Dakota brought an action challenging the constitutionality of 23 U.S.C. § 158, a federal
statute directing the Secretary of Transportation to withhold otherwise allocable funds from
states in which the drinking age was legally below twenty-one years. Id. at 205. The United
States District Court for the District of South Dakota dismissed the complaint, and the ruling
was later confirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Id. The Supreme Court
affirmed the ruling of the lower court, finding the statute to be a constitutional exercise of
Congress’ spending power. Id. at 212. “Congress can trade things within its power—like
money, or regulatory authority, or forbearance from preemption—for state assistance that
would otherwise lie beyond its reach.” Spencer E. Amdur, The Right of Refusal: Immigration
Enforcement and the New Cooperative Federalism, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 87, 120 (2016).
111.
Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08; see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981), rev’d, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), superseded by statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1367, as recognized in Raygor v. Univ. of Minn., 604 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. Ct. App.
2000); Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 91 (1976), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107155, 166 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003);
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936).
112.
Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640; Butler, 297
U.S. at 65).
113.
301 U.S. 619 (1937).
114.
Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. Changing the terms of an existing funding
agreement would be a breach similar in nature to changing the terms of an existing contract.
Andrew Hanson, “Economic Dragooning”: Limiting Trump’s Ability to Punish Sanctuary
Cities,
HARV.
L.
&
POL’Y
REV.
(Dec.
1,
2016),
http://www.harvardlpr.com/2016/12/01/economic-dragooning-limiting-trumps-ability-topunish-sanctuary-cities/.
115.
Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol42/iss1/5

18

Macelloni: A Violation Of The Anti-Commandeering Principle And Spending Powe

2017]

A VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-COMMANDEERING PRINCIPLE

113

and the purpose of the federal program—a limitation of germaneness.116
Fourth, congressional intent in establishing the program cannot constitute a
violation of other specific restrictions imposed on the federal government by
the Constitution.117 Chief Justice Rehnquist also interestingly affirmed near
the end of the opinion “that in some circumstances the financial inducement
offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which
pressure turns into compulsion.”118 Although no compulsion was found in
Dole, the opinion created a new threshold for congressional legislative acts
to be deemed constitutional—opening the gates to additional challenges.119
Although not all parts of the four-part test are allegedly challenged by the
language of the Executive Order, arguments can be made as to at least three
parts.120
1.

Clarity of Intent

In the specific words of Chief Justice Rehnquist, when “Congress
desires to condition the [s]tates’ receipt of federal funds, it ‘must do so
unambiguously . . . , enabl[ing] the [s]tates to exercise their choice
knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.’”121 The
contractual nature of the Taxing and Spending Clause enables jurisdictions to
know the requirements and expectations set forth by Congress before
accepting their end of the bargain.122 Thus, it is counter-intuitive that
Congress’ legitimate use of its spending power depend on whether
acceptance of conditions on funds by local jurisdictions is made
116.
Craig Eichstadt, Twenty-Year Legacy of South Dakota v. Dole, 52 S.D. L.
REV. 458, 458 (2007); accord Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
117.
Dole, 483 U.S. at 208. Language in previous rulings of the Supreme
Court of the United States uncontrovertibly affirms the “proposition that the [spending] power
may not be used to induce the [s]tates to engage in activities that would themselves be
unconstitutional.” Id. at 210.
118.
Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590
(1937)).
119.
See id. at 211–12; e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566, 2604 (2012).
120.
See Eddie Nasser, President Trump Overstepped His Authority on
Sanctuary
Cities,
HARV.
L.
&
POL’Y
REV.
(Feb.
28,
2017),
http://harvardlpr.com/2017/02/28/president-trump-overstepped-his-authority-on-sanctuarycities/.
121.
Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (alteration in original) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981), rev’d, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), superseded by
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, as recognized in Raygor v. Univ. of Minn., 604 N.W.2d 128 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2000)).
122.
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2602–03; Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp., 451 U.S. at 17.
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voluntarily.123 Voluntary and knowing acceptance of federal funds implies
that no implementation of after-the-fact conditions are permitted.124 In fact,
“[t]hough Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power is broad, it
does not include surprising participating [s]tates with post-acceptance or
retroactive conditions.”125 The Court in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius126 clearly states that Congress is not free to penalize
States for their choice to not participate in new programs by taking away
existing funding—a decision that resembles less of a constitutional use of
spending powers, and more of an abuse of it.127
The jurisdictions challenging the Executive Order affirmed that the
main purpose of the Executive Order is to retroactively condition all federal
grants to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373.128 Doubting the clarity of the
Executive Order, the cities and counties bringing the action claimed that the
conditions, being inexistent at the time federal grants were accepted, could
not be accepted knowingly and willingly—as is required by the Dole test—
thus creating forcible conditions on federal grants in violation of the
Constitution.129 These jurisdictions further contended that the ambiguity of
the Executive Order extends to the exact nature of the grants being
conditioned.130 If the Executive Order applies conditions on federal grants,
both the nature of the grants and the amount of federal funds being
conditioned need to be stated clearly, thus allowing the voluntary choice by
States and municipalities to either accept or reject the federal grants.131
Additionally, the ambiguity of the Executive Order extends to the
conduct being specifically targeted.132 If no clear directions are given by the
federal government on whether a certain conduct would fall under the
umbrella of conduct that the Executive Order is trying to limit, then it
becomes nearly impossible for jurisdictions to avoid penalties through policy
adjustments.133
123.
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2602.
124.
Id. at 2606.
125.
Id.
126.
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
127.
See id. at 2607.
128.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (1996); Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive
Relief, supra note 56, at 12.
129.
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987); Complaint for
Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56, at 12.
130.
See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56, at 12.
131.
Cf. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
132.
See Eric Levenson, Seattle Challenges Trump over Executive Order on
‘Sanctuary
Cities’,
CNN:
POL.
(Mar.
30,
2017,
12:26
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/30/politics/seattle-lawsuit-trump-sanctuary-city/index.html.
133.
See Frankel, supra note 99; cf. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981), rev’d, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), superseded by statute, 28
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On the other hand, although refraining from discussion about
whether any existing grant program meets the Dole criteria—compliance
strongly denied by those jurisdictions bringing the lawsuit—the states in
support of the Executive Order confirm the validity of the Executive
Order.134 According to the filed Amici Brief, an authorization by Congress
allowing the Attorney General and Secretary of State to administer grant
programs, conditioning receipt on compliance with specific federal
immigration laws, is well within constitutional boundaries.135
A
memorandum issued by Attorney General Jeff Sessions also helps further
clarify the essence of federal grants potentially conditioned on compliance
with federal immigration laws, thereby rendering meritless the claims of
ambiguity with regard to the nature of the grants.136 The memorandum
affirms that “section 9(a) of the Executive Order . . . will be applied solely to
federal grants administered by the [DOJ] or the [DHS], and not to other
sources of federal funding.”137 However, the memorandum arguably fails
one of its main objectives—specifying the conduct leading to denial of
federal funds.138 Although limiting the term sanctuary jurisdiction to those
jurisdictions that “willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373,” the
memorandum fails to clarify the characteristics of a willful refusal, leaving
states and localities in the dark as to the exactitude of the targeted conduct.139
2.

Nexus Requirement

As a third requirement to achieve constitutionality, Dole affirmed
that a connection must exist between the condition applied to federal grants
and the government interest to be achieved.140 The Dole Court stated that
“conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated ‘to
the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.’”141 What has
U.S.C. § 1367, as recognized in Raygor v. Univ. of Minn., 604 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. Ct. App.
2000).
134.
See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207; Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note
102, at 1–2.
135.
See Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 102, at 8.
136.
See Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, Attorney Gen., Office of the
Attorney Gen. on Implementation of Executive Order 13768, to All Department GrantMaking Components 1–2 (May 22, 2017) (on file with Office of the Attorney Gen.).
137.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at
8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017).
138.
See Priscilla Alvarez, Sessions’s Climbdown on Sanctuary Cities,
ATLANTIC (May 23, 2017), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/sessionssclimbdown-on-sanctuary-cities/527844/.
139.
Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (1996).
140.
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
141.
Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)).
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been recognized as the nexus requirement under the Dole test is only
established when a reasonable relationship between the condition applied by
Congress and the purpose of the federal program exists.142
Thus, a connection must exist between the federal funds being
conditioned by the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, and the
ultimate goal of the Executive Order—compliance with § 1373 of Title 8 of
the United States Code.143 The language of the Executive Order, in
conjunction with the memorandum released by the Attorney General might,
however, frustrate the Executive Order’s intentions.144 In fact, the Attorney
General’s clarification on the identity of the federal grants that could
potentially be affected in the process sheds some light on, but also clashes
with, the express language of the Executive Order.145 The Executive Order
alleges specifically the non-applicability of conditions on grants necessary
for purposes of law enforcement.146 However, since all grants mentioned by
the Attorney General as possible targets are, on different levels, designed for
law enforcement purposes, it becomes unclear what other grants could be
affected.147 The issue is of major relevance, because conditions on grants
unrelated to immigration purposes—thus running afoul of the concept of
germaneness—would be the exact type of federal activity the Dole Court
intended to eliminate.148
3.

Coercion

While not an integral part of the four-prong test developed in Dole,
the anti-coercion requirement is not any less important in establishing
whether conditions on federal grants are constitutional.149 Nevertheless,
although—as noted above—courts recognize that financial inducement

142.
See id. at 213. “I agree that there are four separate types of limitations on
the spending power: [T]he expenditure must be for the general welfare, . . . the conditions
imposed must be unambiguous, . . . they must be reasonably related to the purpose of the
expenditure, . . . and the legislation may not violate any independent constitutional prohibition
. . . .” Id. (O’Conner, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
143.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1373; Dole, 483 U.S. at 207; Letter from Annie Lai,
Assistant Clinical Professor of Law, U.C. Irvine Sch. of Law et al., to Donald J. Trump,
President of the United States of America 3 (Mar. 13, 2017) (on file with the Immigrant Legal
Resource Center).
144.
See Alvarez, supra note 138; Frankel, supra note 99.
145.
See Alvarez, supra note 138; Frankel, supra note 99.
146.
See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017).
147.
See id.; Vivian Yee & Rebecca R. Ruiz, Sessions Narrows Order Against
Sanctuary Cities, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2017, at A18.
148.
See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08.
149.
See id. at 207–08, 211.
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offered by Congress can be over-coercive, congressional threats to withhold
money are upheld when they affect a limited amount of funds.150
In Dole, the Supreme Court found the threat of losing 5% of
highway funds was not impermissibly coercive, and the financial inducement
a “relatively mild encouragement to . . . [s]tates” to implement the language
of the statute.151 In similar scenarios, states have the faculty to decide
whether to accept the condition applied by Congress or deny acceptance of
the grant.152 As stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,153 courts “look to the [s]tates
to defend [its] prerogatives by adopting ‘the simple expedient of not
yielding’ to federal blandishments when they do not want to embrace the
federal policies as their own.”154 When conditions attached to federal funds
resemble a gun to the head, congressional encouragement to state action is
not considered a valid exercise of spending powers.155 If States are not
allowed to practically exercise a choice between acceptance or denial of
conditions, but can only theoretically preserve such power, congressional
actions appear as economic dragooning and are therefore unconstitutional.156
The threat of coercion varies based on the jurisdiction and their
degree of reliance on federal funding for the daily management of duties and
services to the resident population.157 Among the jurisdictions directly
involved in opposing the Executive Order, San Francisco’s yearly budget
gravitates around $10 billion, with approximately $1.2 billion coming
directly from the federal government.158 Santa Clara’s federal funding for
the 2015 to 2016 fiscal year was approximately $1 billion, a staggering 15%

150.
Id. at 211 (citing Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937));
see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012).
151.
Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
152.
Id. at 211–12.
153.
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603 (2012).
154.
Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923)). Being
separate and independent sovereigns, states need to act like it by demonstrating their will. Id.
155.
Id. at 2604–05.
156.
Id. at 2605; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 56, at 60; Hanson, supra
note 114.
157.
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2604. “When we consider . .
. that all South Dakota would lose if she adheres to her chosen course as to a suitable
minimum drinking age is 5% of the funds otherwise obtainable under specifi[c] highway grant
programs, the argument as to coercion is . . . more rhetoric than fact.” Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
158.
Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56, at 16; see
CITY & CTY. OF S.F., MAYOR’S OFFICE OF PUB. POLICY & FIN., MAYOR’S 2017–2018 & 2018–
2019
PROPOSED
BUDGET
11
(2017),
http://www.sfmayor.org/sites/default/files/CSF_Budget_Book_2017_Final_CMYK_LowRes.
pdf.
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of the county’s total budget.159 Further, Chicago received $1.08 billion in
federal funding in 2015, with an estimated increase to $1.25 billion for
2016—roughly 13.5% of the yearly city’s budget.160
The outcome of a coercion analysis regarding whether the Executive
Order represents a coercive exercise of federal spending powers depends on
the exact federal grants that would be withheld in case of non-compliance
with the statute by a state or local jurisdiction.161 Therefore, a coercive effect
would likely be an inevitable outcome if more than just federal funds for
policing were affected.162 Contrarily, it is likely that Courts would rule in
accordance with Dole and uphold the conditions on federal grants.163
B.

Tenth Amendment Umbrella

The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution affirms that “[t]he powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”164 In an
effort to shape the relationship between the federal and state governments,
the language of the Tenth Amendment helps define the concept of
federalism.165 The basic principle established by the Tenth Amendment is
that if powers are “delegated to Congress [by] the Constitution, [then] the
Tenth Amendment . . . [refutes] any reservation of that [specific] power to
the [s]tates.”166 Nevertheless, when a power is “not delegated to [Congress]
by the Constitution,” it belongs to the [s]tates.167

159.
Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 96, at 7.
160.
See CITY OF CHICAGO, 2016 BUDGET OVERVIEW 34 (2016),
http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/obm/supp_info/2016Budget/2016Budget
OverviewCoC.pdf [hereinafter 2016 BUDGET OVERVIEW].
161.
See Cities Under Siege, ECONOMIST (London), May 6, 2017, at 36. For
example, Chicago would only lose $2 million if “the order would affect only federal funds for
policing” as argued by the Attorney General in his memorandum. Id. However, if more
federal grants will be affected, Chicago would lose, according to some estimates, up to $3.6
billion for the current year. Id.
162.
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012).
163.
See id.
164.
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
165.
See id.
166.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992).
167.
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123–24 (1941) (emphasis added).
“It is in this sense that the Tenth Amendment ‘states but a truism that all is retained which has
not been surrendered.’” New York, 505 U.S. at 156 (quoting Darby, 312 U.S. at 124).
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Anti-Commandeering

The Supreme Court of the United States’ understanding and
interpretation of the Tenth Amendment has been that “[t]he States
unquestionably do retai[n] a significant measure of sovereign authority . . . to
the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of their original powers
and transferred those powers to the federal government.”168
[T]he preservation of the [s]tates, and the maintenance of their
governments, are as much within the design and care of the
Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance
of the National [G]overnment. The Constitution, in all its
provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of
169
indestructible [s]tates.

New York v. United States,170 solidified the principle of anticommandeering.171 The Supreme Court of the United States held that
Congress does not have the power to “commandee[r] the legislative
processes of the [s]tates by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a
federal regulatory program.”172 Upheld in Printz v. United States,173 the
prohibition extends to federal directives requiring particular problems to be
addressed, and to orders given to states’ officers to administer and enforce
any federal regulatory program.174 Prohibition to compel states to enact and
168.
New York, 505 U.S. at 156 (alterations in original) (quoting Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549 (1985)); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (noting that the structure of the Constitution reveals the system of dual
sovereignty as a controlling principle).
169.
Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1868).
170.
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
171.
Id. at 145, 202 (White, J., concurring). The language of the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendment Act of 1985 specified that a state or regional compact
failing to provide disposal of internally generated waste by a particular date must take title and
possession of the waste. Id. at 153–54 (majority opinion). The provision also directed States
to assume liability for internally generated waste if they failed to comply. Id. Writing for the
majority, Justice O’Connor found the provision impermissibly coercive, and thus,
unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 176, 188.
172.
New York, 505 U.S. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981) (affirming that the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 was constitutional for the exact reason that it did not commandeer
the States into regulating mining)).
173.
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
174.
Id. at 935. The Supreme Court held the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act of 1968, which required the Attorney General to establish a national system
for instant background checking of prospective handgun purchasers and to command the chief
law enforcement officers nationwide to conduct checks and related police tasks,
unconstitutional. Id. at 933–34.
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administer federal programs applies regardless of whether congressional
commands to regulate are pointed directly to states, or a state is coerced to
implement a federal regulatory system.175 Notwithstanding the principles
enunciated in both New York and Printz, support of state governments and
officials is possible when national security is at stake, therefore authorizing
an exception to anti-commandeering for reasons beyond the general control
of the federal government.176
The Executive Order arguably affects states and local jurisdictions in
two ways: First, compelling jurisdictions to comply with federal detainer
requests in order to avoid being labeled as a sanctuary, thus losing
funding;177 and second, preventing jurisdictions from exercising those police
powers assigned to them under the Tenth Amendment.178
a.

ICE Detainers

The language of section 9(b) of the Executive Order indicates that
jurisdictions failing to comply with any ICE detainer request fall within the
category of sanctuary jurisdictions.179 An ICE civil detainer consists of local
law enforcement agencies requesting local jurisdictions to keep inmates held
for actual or suspected violations of state criminal laws for up to forty-eight
hours after the inmate’s scheduled release—potentially extending detention
up to five days when arrests and custody stretch over a holiday weekend.180
The detainers serve the purpose of giving ICE agents enough time to verify
the information within federal databases and determine whether the
individual should be taken into federal custody.181
In its attempt to enforce ICE detainers, the language of the Executive
Order—perceived as mandatory—runs afoul of constitutional principles
established by judicial interpretation.182 In 2014, the Third Circuit Court of
175.

See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606–07

(2012).
176.
See Printz, 521 U.S. at 940; Daniel Booth, Note, Federalism on ICE:
State and Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration Law, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1063,
1073 (2006). “Matters such as the enlistment of air raid wardens, the administration of a
military draft . . . or perhaps the threat of an international terrorist, may require a national
response before federal personnel can be made available to respond.” Printz, 521 U.S. at 940
(Stevens, J. dissenting).
177.
See Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note 143, at 1.
178.
Id.
179.
Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017).
180.
Stubblefield, supra note 51, at 546–47.
181.
Id. at 545; see also U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, 306-112-002B,
ISSUANCE OF IMMIGRATION DETAINERS BY ICE IMMIGRATION OFFICERS 2, 4 (Mar. 24, 2017).
182.
See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8799. But see Galarza v.
Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 643 (3d Cir. 2014).
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Appeals in Galarza v. Szalczyk,183 affirmed that local governments are not
under any duty to comply with ICE civil detainer requests, which are strictly
voluntary.184 In fact, “settled constitutional law clearly establishes that
[immigration detainers] must be deemed requests” because, under the Tenth
Amendment, any other interpretation would render them unconstitutional.185
Ordering imprisonment of suspected aliens subject to removal would, in fact,
be inconsistent with the essential principles of anti-commandeering.186 The
constitutional violations resulting from mandated imprisonment are not
limited to the Tenth Amendment, but often further extend to violations of the
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.187
In Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County,188 the court found
Clackamas County in violation of Miranda-Olivares’s Fourth Amendment
right against unreasonable seizures.189 Although the county argued that the
seizure was a mere continuation of the original arrest, the court found
otherwise.190 The “prolonged warrantless, post-arrest, pre-arraignment
custody” by the county jail was not justified by the pending detainer request
by ICE.191 A similar ruling was given by the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit in Morales v. Chadbourne,192 where the court found a twenty-fourhour imprisonment pursuant to an ICE detainer a violation of the arrestee’s
Fourth Amendment rights.193 The court stated that, absent a warrant,
immigration officers have the faculty to arrest an alien “only if they have
‘reason to believe that the alien so arrested is in the United States in violation
183.
745 F.3d 634 (3d Cir. 2014).
184.
See id. at 643, 645.
185.
Id. at 643.
186.
Id.
187.
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty., No.
3:12-CV-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *1, 9, 11 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014). A wellestablished principle is that “[t]he Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person,
including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest.” United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
188.
No. 3:12-CV-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014).
189.
See id. at *11. “Miranda-Olivares was arrested for violating a . . .
restraining order and booked into the [county] [j]ail.” Id. at *1. According to its policy to
report arrests of foreign-born persons “on a warrant or probable cause charge[s],” the jail
notified ICE, and a detainer request was issued to the jail the following day. Id. In
furtherance of ICE objectives, the jail also honors detainers “even if the underlying state
criminal charges are resolved or bail is posted.” Id. at *2. Arrested on March 14, 2012,
“Miranda-Olivares remained in custody . . . on . . . state charges until March 29, 2012,” but
due to the ICE detainer, remained in custody until the following day, when picked up by DHS
agents. Miranda-Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305, at *2–3.
190.
Id. at *9.
191.
Id.
192.
793 F.3d 208 (1st Cir. 2015).
193.
See id. at 211, 218, 223.
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of any [immigration] law or regulation and is likely to escape before a
warrant can be obtained for his arrest.’”194 The court further affirmed that
reason to believe must be effectively considered equal to probable cause for
the arrest, and that arrests made in its absence are in violation of Fourth
Amendment principles.195 The plethora of lawsuits and consequential
liability for Fourth Amendment violations are some of the reasons why cities
and counties across the United States enact policies restricting compliance
with ICE detainers.196
Given the extensive jurisprudence on the unconstitutionality of
detainer requests, which often lead to prolonged arrest periods for aliens
absent probable cause, it becomes difficult to not justify the decision of local
jurisdictions to refuse compliance to ICE detainers, which is likely a mere
exercise of constitutional police powers.197
b.

Police Powers

The so-called police powers are the states’ reserved constitutional
authority under the Tenth Amendment to promote health, safety, and welfare
of their residents.198 In Sligh v. Kirkwood,199 the Supreme Court of the
United States affirmed that:
The police power, in its broadest sense, includes all legislation and
almost every function of civil government. It is not subject to
definite limitations, but [it] is coextensive with the necessities of
the case and the safeguards of public interest. It embraces
regulations designed to promote public convenience or the general
prosperity or welfare, as well as those specifically intended to
200
promote the public safety or the public health.

Sanctuary policies reflect determination by states and local
jurisdiction to exercise their judgment and promote health and safety of their
194.
Id. at 216 (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(a)(2) (2012)).
195.
Id. (citing Tejeda-Mata v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 626 F.2d
721, 725 (9th Cir. 1980)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2).
196.
See Jennifer Medina, Fearing Lawsuits, Sheriffs Balk at U.S. Request to
Hold Noncitizens for Extra Time, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2014, at A10.
197.
See Morales, 793 F.3d at 211–12; Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty.,
No. 3:12-CV-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *11 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014); Medina, supra
note 196.
198.
U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 59
(1915).
199.
237 U.S. 52 (1915).
200.
Id. at 59 (citations omitted).
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residents.201 It is undisputed that “[t]he promotion of safety of persons and
property is . . . at the core of the [s]tate’s police power.”202 United States v.
Morrison203 affirms the long recognized principle that states possess a unique
domain of authority over many functions of government.204 In fact, the
Founders “ensured that powers which ‘in the ordinary course of affairs,
concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people’ were held by
governments more local and more accountable than a distant federal
bureaucracy.”205 Moreover, the choice to limit direct involvement in the
enforcement of federal immigration policies is dictated by practical issues of
community management, and is strongly supported by those charged with
patrolling the community to ensure its safety.206 The Executive Order
arguably infringes upon the discretion of local law enforcement authorities to
make the policy judgments deemed necessary, replacing them with federal
preferences.207 Law enforcement agencies throughout the country have
shown support for sanctuary policies.208 Police chiefs and sheriffs, together
with the Major Cities Chiefs Association, sustain that using local law

201.
Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note 143, at 1.
202.
Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976).
203.
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
204.
Id. at 618.
205.
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012)
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 262 (James Madison) (American Bar Association ed.,
2009)). The issue of accountability is a fundamental factor in the jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court. Id. at 2592, 2602. “Accountability is considered a particularly powerful
argument against commandeering . . . .” Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken,
Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1289 (2009); cf. New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992) (affirming that “where the federal government directs the [s]tates to
regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the
federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral
ramifications of their decision[s].”).
206.
Pham, supra note 48, at 981.
207.
See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fe. Reg. 8799, 8799-801 (Jan. 25, 2017);
Brief of Amici Curiae California Cities & Counties-Alameda, Berkeley, Davis, East Palo
Alto, Fremont, Marin, Monterey, Mountain View, Oakland, Richmond, Salinas, San Jose,
Santa Cruz, Santa Rosa at 5, 10–11, City & Cty. of S.F. v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485-WHO
(N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 31, 2017) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae California Cities &
Counties]. The argument is based on the Supreme Court’s assertion that the wide discretion
given to the states to determine what is necessary—and what is not—must be respected. East
N.Y. Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 233 (1945).
208.
See Chuck Wexler, Police Chiefs Across the Country Support Sanctuary
Cities Because They Keep Crime Down, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2017, 4:00 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-wexler-sanctuary-cities-immigration-crime20170306-story.html.
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enforcement agents to further federal immigration laws would be a detriment
to the safety of local communities.209
Police apprehension towards local officers enforcing federal
immigration laws is based upon multiple reasons.210 First, enforcement of
immigration laws risks “[u]ndermin[ing] [the] [t]rust and [c]ooperation of
[i]mmigrant [c]ommunities.”211 Studies have shown that a majority of chiefs
and sheriffs—from both red and blue states—consider maintaining high
levels of trust with the immigrant communities towards police officers a
priority.212 If any sort of trust is lacking, a reasonable consequence to the
legitimate fear for deportation, the process of community policing is halted,
hindering the community.213 Second, “budgets and resources of local police
agencies” are limited when compared to the economic power of the federal
government—making the use of local officers to implement federal
immigration laws financially burdensome for local communities.214 Third,
federal immigration laws present complicated policies, both on the civil and
criminal side of the law, and local agents are not necessarily fit to enforce
them.215 Fourth, local police lack the degree of authority that federal agents
can exercise when enforcing immigration laws, thus increasing the level of
difficulty for local agents to discern whether a particular violation results in
criminal charges or mere civil violations.216 Finally, participation of local
police officers in the enforcement of immigration laws would possibly
expose local agencies to civil litigation and liability.217 “By upending the
independent judgment of local officials responsible for ‘the suppression of
209.
See Tom Jawetz, Trump’s Deportation Rules Will Make America Unsafe
Again, FORTUNE (Feb. 24, 2017), http://www.fortune.com/2017/02/24/donald-trump-publicsafety-executive-order-deportation-immigration-illegal-undocumented/.
210.
See CRAIG E. FERRELL, JR. ET AL., MAJOR CITIES CHIEFS IMMIGRATION
COMM., M.C.C. NINE (9) POINT POSITION STATEMENT: ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS
BY LOCAL POLICE AGENCIES 5–8 (2006).
211.
Id. at 5.
212.
See id. at 5–6; Wayne A. Cornelius et al., Giving Sanctuary to
Undocumented Immigrants Doesn’t Threaten Public Safety—It Increases It, L.A. TIMES (Feb.
2, 2017, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-sanctuary-cities-trump20170202-story.html.
213.
Amicus Brief of 34 Cities & Counties in Support of County of Santa
Clara’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 7–8, Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv00574-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 3, 2017) [hereinafter Amicus Brief]; Brief of Amici Curiae
California Cities & Counties—Alameda, Berkeley, Davis, East Palo Alto, Fremont, Marin,
Monterey, Mountain View, Oakland, Richmond, Salinas, San Jose, Santa Cruz, Santa Rosa at
5, City & Cty. of S.F. v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 31, 2017)
[hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae California Cities & Counties].
214.
FERRELL, JR. ET AL., supra note 210, at 6.
215.
See id. at 7.
216.
See id. at 7–8.
217.
Id. at 8.
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violent crime and vindication of its victims,’ . . . the Executive Order
intrudes upon a power reserved for the states and local governments, and
threatens to undermine the mission of local law enforcement.”218
Data analysis hints to a different reality than the one claimed by
President Trump, and police departments across the country seem to agree
with it.219 The data evidences that sanctuary jurisdictions present a lower
average criminality level when compared to comparably sized non-sanctuary
jurisdictions.220 Although numerically not impressive, researchers point out
results that are statistically important, like lower crime and homicide rates.221
Generally, however, production of conflicting studies and interpretation of
data render an objective analysis of the issue all but simple.222 Taking
Phoenix, Arizona as an example, data shows that crime rates fell by
impressive margins following the city renouncing its sanctuary status.223 A
six-year study from the University of California, Riverside found levels of
violent crimes to be “slightly higher in sanctuary cities.”224 Independent
from the crime rates analysis, it is important to highlight that one of the main
fears of pro-sanctuary police departments across the country—decrease in
crime reports resulting from the distrust towards law enforcement and
immigration agents in non-sanctuary jurisdictions—is legitimate.225 Crime
reports in Latino communities throughout the United States are decreasing,
thus making police officers’ investigating jobs harder while simultaneously
increasing the amount of silent victims.226 Therefore, although conflicting
data exists, it is indisputably within the interest, right, and power of local

218.
Amicus Brief, supra note 213, at 8 (quoting United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000)).
219.
See Christopher Ingraham, Trump Says Sanctuary Cities Are Hotbeds of
Crime.
Data Say the Opposite., CHI. TRIB.: NEWS (Jan. 27, 2017, 2:37 PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-trump-sanctuary-city-crime-data20170127-story.html.
220.
See id.
221.
See id.
222.
See William Lajeunesse, Crime Drops in Phoenix After City Drops
Sanctuary City Status, Former Cops Say, FOX NEWS: POL. (June 30, 2017),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/06/30/crime-drops-in-phoenix-after-city-dropssanctuary-city-status-former-cops-say.html.
223.
See id.
224.
Id.
225.
See James Queally, Latinos Are Reporting Fewer Sexual Assaults Amid a
Climate of Fear in Immigrant Communities, LAPD Says, L.A. TIMES: LOCAL (Mar. 21, 2017,
8:25 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-immigrant-crime-reporting-drops20170321-story.html.
226.
See id.
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jurisdictions to foster participation of all members of the community when it
comes to crime reporting and cooperation.227
2.

Are Sanctuary Policies Targeted by the Executive Order Preempted
by 8 U.S.C. § 1373?

As confirmed by the Attorney General, the intent of the Executive
Order is to enforce 8 U.S.C. § 1373 against jurisdictions deemed to be in
violation of the language of the statute.228 However, it is not clear whether
by implementing their policies, sanctuary jurisdictions are in violation of the
statute, thus triggering federal preemption.229 The relationship between
federal and state law in case of a conflict is regulated by the preemption
doctrine, which provides the superiority of federal law over state law.230 A
classical analysis of preemption principles generally considers whether the
language of the “federal law expressly precludes state and local governments
from passing such a law.”231 De Canas v. Bica232 developed a similar
analysis to determine whether state or local policies are preempted.233 The
three-prong analysis first considers “whether the law is attempting to
regulate immigration;” second, whether it occupies “a field [generally]
occupied by Congress;” and third, whether it is in conflict with federal
law.234 The first and second prongs are easily discernible because they “are
unique to immigration law.”235 It is a widely recognized principle that the
power to regulate immigration matters is retained by the federal
government.236 The third prong is based upon the Supremacy Clause.237
227.
See Jawetz, supra note 209.
228.
Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note 143, at 2; see
also 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (1996); Maria Sacchetti & Sari Horwitz, Sessions Memo Defines
Sanctuary Cities — and Hints That the Definition May Widen, WASH. POST: SOC. ISSUE (May
22,
2017),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/sessions-memo-definessanctuary-cities--and-hints-that-the-definition-may-widen/2017/05/22/68f8c9ec-3f1a-11e79869-bac8b44829a_story.
229.
See Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note 143, at 2,
2 n.7; Yee & Ruiz, supra note 147.
230.
See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43
(1963); Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 771
(1994).
231.
Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Rose Cuison Villazor, Sanctuary Policies &
Immigration Federalism: A Dialectic Analysis, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1683, 1698 (2009).
232.
424 U.S. 351 (1976).
233.
See id. at 356–63; Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 231, at 1699.
234.
Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 231, at 1698–99; see also De Canas,
424 U.S. at 35463.
235.
Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 231, at 1699.
236.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. “The Congress shall have [the] [p]ower . . .
[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . .” Id.
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The language of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 primarily targets only one of the
three scholarly-developed categories of sanctuary policies namely the socalled don’t tell policies.238 Summing up the language of the statute
analyzed in Part II of this Comment, the statute “prohibits government
entities, agencies, officials, and persons from preventing the voluntary
reporting of a person’s immigration status by any governmental entity,
officials, or employees to federal immigration authority.”239 Sanctuary
policies have been enacted by jurisdictions throughout the country, however,
did not include, for the most part, any language prohibiting communications
between local and federal authorities.240 For example, Santa Clara
authorities prohibit employees from using County resources to transmit any
information to federal agencies that was collected while providing services to
the community.241 Santa Clara further prohibits employees from initiating
inquiries or enforcement actions based upon the actual or suspected
immigration status of the individual, national origin, race, ethnicity, or
English-speaking ability.242 Another example of a don’t ask policy is given
by the City of Philadelphia, where police officers are required “not [to] ask
about the documentation status of people they encounter,” although
cooperation with federal agencies in “anti-terrorism and drug trafficking task
forces” is encouraged.243 New Orleans also has similar policies.244 The New
Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”) forbids officers from initiating
investigations or taking law enforcement actions due to immigration status,
“including the initiation of a stop, an apprehension, [or] arrest,” a policy

237.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.

This Constitution, and the [l]aws of the United States which shall be made in
[p]ursuance thereof; and all [t]reaties made, or which shall be made, under the [a]uthority of
the United States shall be the supreme [l]aw of the [l]and; and the [j]udges in every state shall
be bound thereby, any [t]hing in the Constitution or [l]aws of any [s]tate to the [c]ontrary
notwithstanding.

Id.
238.
Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 231, at 1700, 1704; see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1373 (1996).
239.
Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 231, at 1700.
240.
See id. at 1692–93; CITY OF PHILA., OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, IMMIGRATION
& SANCTUARY CITIES:
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA ACTION GUIDE (2017),
http://beta.phila.gov/posts/office-of-immigrant-affairs/2017-02-24-immigration-sanctuarycities-city-of-philadelphia-action-guide/.
241.
See Bd. of Supervisors of the Cty. of Santa Clara Res. 2010-316 (2010).
242.
Id.; see also Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 215 (1st Cir. 2015).
Reasonable suspicion is required for police officers to stop individuals and inquire about
“them regarding their immigration status.” Morales, 793 F.3d at 215.
243.
CITY OF PHILA., supra note 240; Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1455.
244.
See NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEP’T, OPERATIONS MANUAL CH. 41.6.1,
IMMIGRATION STATUS 1 (2016).
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fitting the parameters of so-called don’t enforce policies.245 The NOPD also
explicitly states that the activities of police officers must be in compliance
with the statutory requirements, and that communications between federal
Jurisdictions
and local law enforcement agents are welcomed. 246
implementing don’t ask policies also respect judicial doctrines against brief
stops—absent reasonable suspicion—of alien individuals for inquiries on the
alien’s immigration status.247 Detention to inquire about an individual’s
immigration status has in fact been ruled a seizure implicating the Fourth
Amendment.248 Further, “no exception to the Tenth Amendment” permits
federal mandates to the states to disclose private information of residents
gathered by the exercise of sovereign capacity.249 The principle is embedded
in the Supreme Court’s ruling in Reno v. Condon,250 allowing federal
requirements of information sharing only when not requiring states “to enact
any laws or regulations, and it does not require state officials to assist in the
enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals.”251
Nothing within the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 can be read to
preempt jurisdictions from prohibiting the use of local funds to help federal
agencies in enforcing immigration laws.252 Further, the statute does not
proscribe the implementation of policies designed to prevent police officers
from proactively searching for information that would not be promptly or
inevitably available to them.253 In fact, although an argument could be
presented that the language of the statute impliedly preempts proscriptions of
information-gathering activities by police officers, it appears that the statute
was designed to foster communication between agencies of already available
information.254 It is well established that:
245.
Id.; Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1455. Multiple jurisdictions across the
country implemented policies presenting the same characteristics. Gulasekaram & Villazor,
supra note 231, at 1694.
246.
See NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEP’T, supra note 244, at 1, 3.
247.
CITY OF PHILA., supra note 240; Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1455; Pham,
supra note 48, at 982.
248.
Lopez v. Garriga, 917 F.2d 63, 69 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216–17 (1984)).
249.
Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note 143, at 5; see
also U.S. CONST. amend. X.
250.
528 U.S. 141 (2000).
251.
Id. at 151; Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note
143, at 5.
252.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (1996).
253.
See id.
254.
See id.; Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 231, at 1703.
This Court, in considering the validity of state laws in the light of treaties or federal
laws touching the same subject, has made use of the following expressions:
[C]onflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference;
irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference. But none
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Congress, in passing 8 U.S.C. § 1373, opted not to require state
and local governments to ask for an individual’s immigration
status or mandate them to report such status to immigration
officials. Congress was well aware of the sanctuary movement
when it passed this law yet it chose not to mandate the gathering or
255
reporting of information.

Realistically, the statute only prohibits jurisdictions from imposing
restrictions on the sharing of collected information.256 An argument under
the Supremacy Clause would likely fail, because no inconsistency with the
language of the statute is created by sanctuary policies.257 Courts may
conclude, and many scholars have agreed, that “sanctuary policies [are] not
[in] violat[ion] [of] 8 U.S.C. § 1373.”258
Albeit this interpretation of the statute is probable, some jurisdictions
opted to accept the request of the federal government and vowed to strictly
implement the statute.259 Under the pressure of the DOJ, the Mayor of
Miami-Dade County ordered jails to comply with detainer requests from
federal officials—a decision later upheld by the county commission.260
V.

FLORIDA LOCALITIES

The State of Florida is no stranger to the debate around sanctuary
jurisdictions and possible defunding from the federal government.261 As a
final destination to many immigrants, both legal and illegal, Florida contains

of these expressions provides an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive
constitutional yardstick.

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
255.
Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 231, at 1703 (emphasis in original).
256.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a)–(b).
257.
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; 8 U.S.C. § 1373; Bd. of Supervisors of the
Cty. of Santa Clara Res. 2010-316 (2010). But see Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae, supra
note 102, at 10–12.
258.
Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note 143, at 2
(emphasis in original); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1373.
259.
See Skyler Swisher, Crackdown on ‘Sanctuary’ Counties by Trump Spurs
Policy Change in Miami-Dade, SUN-SENTINEL (Fla.), Jan. 27, 2017, at B3; Elise Foley,
Miami-Dade Will Abandon ‘Sanctuary’ Immigration Policies After Trump Order, Mayor
Says, HUFFPOST: POL. (Jan. 26, 2017, 7:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/miamidade-sanctuary-city_us_588a887ee4b0230ce61b0476.
260.
See Swisher, supra note 259; Foley, supra note 259; Alan Gomez, MiamiDade Commission Votes to End County’s ‘Sanctuary’ Status, USA TODAY (Feb. 17, 2017,
8:27
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2017/02/17/miami-dade-countygrapples-sanctuary-city-president-trump-threat/98050976/.
261.
Foley, supra note 259; Swisher, supra note 259.
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one of the highest foreign-born populations in the country.262 In the twentyfive year span between 1990 and 2015, the percentage of foreign-born
residents of Florida grew from 12.9% in 1990 to 20.2% in 2015.263
According to the 2015 census conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau’s
American Community Survey, over four million Florida residents are foreign
born.264 Among them, 75.1% were born in Latin America.265 Online data
sources show that Florida has, within its territory, about two dozen
jurisdictions with sanctuary policies including Broward County, Palm Beach
County, and Miami Beach.266 However, many jurisdictions disagree with the
label of sanctuary that has been given to them.267 Both Broward County and
Palm Beach County affirmed their compliance with federal immigration
laws.268 Nevertheless, actions taken by the Sheriff’s Department in both
counties may be considered otherwise.269 Broward County Sheriff’s Office
stopped honoring ICE detainers after courts ruled them unconstitutional in
2014.270 Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office also enforces similar detainer
procedures.271 Moreover, in an attempt to appease their large immigrant
communities, Broward County passed a resolution defining itself as “an
inclusive county which welcomes, celebrates, and offers refuge to all
residents and visitors irrespective of race, religion, ethnicity, or national
262.
See State Immigration Data Profiles: California, MIGRATION POL’Y INST.,
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/state-profiles/state/demographics/CA (last visited Dec.
31, 2017); State Immigration Data Profiles: Florida, MIGRATION POL’Y INST.,
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/state-profiles/state/demographics/FL (last visited Dec.
31, 2017); State Immigration Data Profiles: New York, MIGRATION POL’Y INST.,
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/state-profiles/state/demographics/NY (last visited Dec.
31, 2017); State Immigration Data Profiles: Texas, MIGRATION POL’Y INST.,
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/state-profiles/state/demographics/TX (last visited Dec.
31, 2017).
263.
State Immigration Data Profiles: Florida, supra note 262.
264.
Id.
265.
Id.
266.
See Ohio Jobs & Justice PAC, The Original List of Sanctuary Cities, USA,
OJJPAC, http://www.ojjpac.org/sanctuary.asp (last updated July 29, 2017).
267.
See Swisher, supra note 259.
268.
See id.
269.
See Rebecca Sharpless, Dade, Broward Lead the Way, MIAMI HERALD
(July 24, 2014, 6:09 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/op-ed/article1976943.html.
270.
Larry Barszewski, Broward Seeks Sanctuary from ‘Sanctuary’ Label, SUN
SENTINAL: BROWARD POL. (Mar. 14, 2017, 7:40 PM), http://www.sunsentinel.com/local/broward/broward-politics-blog/fl-blog-broward-sanctuary-city-20170314story.html.
271.
See Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., Report Shows Law Enforcement
Agencies in at Least 30 Florida Counties Would be Punished by Proposed Anti-Immigrant
Law (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.aclufl.org/en/press-releases/report-shows-law-enforcementagencies-least-30-florida-counties-would-be-punished.
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origin.”272 Parallel efforts were also made by the City of West Palm Beach,
which declared itself “a welcoming city for immigrants.”273 Although noncompliance with ICE detainers is among the types of conduct that the
Executive Order is trying to eliminate, it is not established whether friendly
relationships with immigrant communities risk labeling Florida jurisdictions
as sanctuaries.274 However, one thing is clear: Some degree of confusion
exists regarding the conduct targeted by the Executive Order and the possible
consequences for non-complying jurisdictions.275
Florida State Legislators, however, are trying to solve some of the
issues and to untie the Gordian Knot.276
The Florida House of
Representatives approved a bill “prohibiting local law enforcement from
resisting compliance with federal immigration laws and [detainer] requests”
from ICE.277 Although the bill will unlikely become law—because no
discussion has occurred yet on the floor of the Senate—legislators are
showing anxiety regarding the possible consequences of the Executive
Order.278 However, the Florida House of Representatives is not the first
legislating body within state boundaries to adopt policies in compliance with
federal requests.279

272.
Broward Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs 2017–030, § 1 (2017); Chris Persaud,
Six Federal Grants to South Florida That Trump Could Threaten Under Sanctuary Cities
Order, WLRN (Mar. 16, 2017), http://www.wlrn.org/post/six-federal-grants-south-floridatrump-could-threaten-under-sanctuary-cities-order.
273.
See Peter Haden, West Palm Beach Declares Itself ‘Welcoming City’ for
Immigrants, WGCU (Mar. 28, 2017, 9:05 PM), http://news.wgcu.org/post/west-palm-beachdeclares-itself-welcoming-city-immigrants.
274.
See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017);
Garrett Epps, Trump’s Sloppy, Unconstitutional Order on ‘Sanctuary Cities’, ATLANTIC (Jan.
30,
2017),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/trumps-sloppyunconstitutional-order-on-sanctuary-cities/514883/; Persaud, supra note 272.
275.
See Barszewski, supra note 270; Sacchetti & Horwitz, supra note 228.
276.
See Kristen M. Clark, Florida House Approves Ban—and Penalties—on
‘Sanctuary’
Cities,
MIAMI
HERALD,
(Apr.
28,
2017,
4:56
PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article147453654.html.
277.
Id.
278.
Id.; see also Daniel Ducassi, Bill Cracking Down on ‘Sanctuary Cities’
Clears First Committee Stop, POLITICO: FLA. (Mar. 13, 2017, 7:01 PM),
http://www.politico.com/states/florida/story/2017/03/bill-cracking-down-on-sanctuary-citiesclears-first-committee-stop-110339. The bill, later affirmed by the Florida House, compels
state and local governments to support enforcement of federal immigration law, barring the
creation and implementation of any law or practice hindering the operations of federal
officers. Ducassi, supra; see also Clark, supra note 276. The bill is a response to judicial
injunctions of the Executive Order, and bypasses constitutional challenges to the Executive
Order through state action. See Ducassi, supra.
279.
See Memorandum from Carlos A. Gimenez, Mayor, Miami-Dade Cty., to
Daniel Junior, Interim Dir., Corrections & Rehab. Dep’t (Jan. 26, 2017).
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Miami-Dade County

Miami-Dade is the only county in the United States where foreignborn residents constitute the majority.280 According to the latest census data
from the United States Census Bureau, 51.7% of Miami-Dade County’s
population is foreign-born, with a heavy majority being of Hispanic or
Latino heritage.281 Yet, on January 26, 2017, the day after President Trump
signed the Executive Order, Miami-Dade County Mayor Carlos Gimenez
announced his agreement with the new policies.282 The Mayor released a
memorandum to all county jails, directing them to observe federal detainer
requests.283 The memorandum stated that, “[i]n light of the provisions of the
Executive Order, I direct . . . to honor all immigration detainer requests
received from the Department of Homeland Security. Miami-Dade County
complies with federal law and intends to fully cooperate with the [F]ederal
[G]overnment.”284 In an effort to avoid the label of sanctuary city, thus
risking sanctions in the form of cuts in federal funding, Miami-Dade County
Commissioners voted in favor of the mayoral policy.285 The decision
reversed a previous county policy, approved in 2013, opposing detention as a
result of detainer requests from federal agencies.286
The 2013 policy created a two-fold threshold to allow detainers.287
First, for the county to allow ICE detainers, the federal government had to
agree to reimburse all costs associated with the detention—an agreement
which had to be in writing.288 Second, once the reimbursement was agreed
280.
See State Immigration Data Profiles: Florida, supra note 262; U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, Quick Facts: Miami-Dade County, Florida, CENSUS.GOV,
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/miamidadecountyflorida/POP060210 (last visited
Dec. 31, 2017).
281.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 280.
282.
Jonathan Levin, Miami’s Mayor Climbs Aboard the Trump Train,
BLOOMBERG:
BUSINESSWEEK
(Feb.
16,
2017,
11:00
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-16/miami-s-mayor-climbs-aboard-thetrump-train; Kate Samuelson, Miami-Dade Is No Longer a ‘Sanctuary’ for Undocumented
Immigrants, TIME: MIAMI (Jan. 27, 2017), http://www.time.com/4651518/miami-dade-mayorsanctuary-city-donald-trump/.
283.
Memorandum from Carlos A. Gimenez to Daniel Junior, supra note 279.
284.
Id.
285.
Patricia Mazzei & Douglas Hanks, Fearing Trump, Commission Drops
Miami-Dade’s ‘Sanctuary’ Protections, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 17, 2017, 4:05 PM)
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article133413384.html.
286.
See id.; Patricia Mazzei, Miami-Dade Plans to Stop Paying for Federal
Immigration
Detentions,
MIAMI
HERALD
(Dec.
18,
2013,
6:22
PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article1958627.html.
287.
See Letter from Howard Simon, Exec. Dir., ACLU of Florida et al., to
Miami-Dade Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs 3–4 (Feb. 6, 2017) (on file with ACLU of Florida).
288.
Id. at 4.
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upon, detainers would be implemented only against individuals charged or
convicted of certain enumerated offenses—principally felonies.289 Although
the Board of County Commissioners passed a resolution upholding the antidetainer policies in December of 2013, the tide changed quickly after
President Trump signed the Executive Order, and a February vote by the
same body reinstated full cooperation for detainers.290 The county’s
decisions have already presented legal consequences.291
1.

Lacroix v. Junior

On March 3, 2017, Judge Milton Hirsch of the Eleventh Judicial
Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County ruled the detention of James Lacroix,
a Haitian national, unconstitutional.292 Judge Hirsch found the coercive
conduct of ICE, pushing the Miami-Dade County jail to continue to
incarcerate Lacroix, a violation of the Tenth Amendment.293 Questioning the
constitutionality of the detainer, and denying the Miami-Dade County
alleged sanctuary city status, Judge Hirsch affirmed that: “[T]he issue raised
. . . has nothing to do with affording sanctuary to those unlawfully in this
country. It has everything to do with the separation of powers between the
state and federal governments as reflected in the Tenth Amendment to, and
in the very structure of, the United States Constitution.”294
The jail’s decision to comply with ICE’s demands to detain Lacroix
is, in the words of Judge Hirsch, “a demand with which the local government
is constitutionally prohibited from complying.”295 The beneficiaries of the
289.
Id.
290.
See Alan Gomez, Miami-Dade Commission Votes to End County’s
‘Sanctuary’
Status,
USA
TODAY
(Feb.
17,
2017,
8:27
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2017/02/17/miami-dade-county-grapplessanctuary-city-president-trump-threat/98050976/; Mazzei & Hanks, supra note 285.
291.
See Elise Foley & Cristian Farias, Judge Rebukes Miami-Dade County for
Appeasing Trump on ‘Sanctuary City’ Crackdown, HUFFPOST: POL. (Mar. 3, 2017, 6:09 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/miami-dade-sanctuarytrump_us_58b9d325e4b05cf0f4008a46; Mazzei & Hanks, supra note 285.
292.
Order on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 10, 15, Lacroix v. Junior,
No. F17-376, 2017 WL 1037453, at *1 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Mar. 3, 2017); David Ovalle, Judge
Shoots Down Miami-Dade Detention Policy Adopted to Follow Trump Deportation Order,
MIAMI
HERALD
(Mar.
3,
2017,
10:06
AM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article136179733.html;
Kalhan Rosenblatt, Miami-Dade’s Policy of Holding Inmates for ICE Is Unconstitutional:
Florida Judge, NBC: NEWS (Mar. 3, 2017, 4:59 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/miami-s-policy-holding-inmates-ice-unconstitutional-florida-judge-n728786.
293.
See Order on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 292, at 9–11.
294.
Id. at 5 (emphasis in original).
295.
Id. at 8. “It might well be deemed an unconstitutional exercise . . . to
insist that the states are bound to provide means to carry into effect the duties of the national

Published by NSUWorks, 2018

39

Nova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 5

134

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

constitutional structure are the people, whose rights and liberties are
protected through a strong-willed local government in opposition to a heavyhanded federal government.296
Judge Hirsch’s ruling lends way to the fact that, regardless of
whether or not a jurisdiction is a sanctuary—and regardless of the fact that
local agencies and officials support President Trump’s crackdown on
immigration—there are constitutional rights afforded to every person in this
country, legal or illegal, which simply cannot be infringed upon.297
2.

Creedle v. Gimenez

Tenth Amendment violations, however, are not the only claims that
have been raised against Miami-Dade County as a result of the new
policies.298 The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) of Florida, in
conjunction with the University of Miami School of Law’s Immigration
Clinic, filed a federal suit against the county for violation of the Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.299 In Creedle v. Gimenez,300
the action was filed on behalf of Garland Creedle, an American citizen
voluntarily detained by Miami-Dade County in response to an ICE
detainer.301 After being arrested on the evening of March 12, 2017, Creedle
was fingerprinted by county correctional officials.302 After receiving an
immigration detainer from ICE, correctional officers refused to release
Creedle upon bond being posted.303 Although notified that Creedle was an
American citizen by Creedle himself, county correctional officers did not
release him until the next day.304
The Fourth Amendment violation, alleged by the ACLU, is a direct
result of the nature of the ICE detainers implemented by Miami-Dade.305
government, nowhere delegated or [e]ntrusted . . . to them by the Constitution.” Id. (quoting
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 541 (1842)).
296.
See id. at 8–9.
297.
See Order on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 292, at 14.
298.
See Caitlin Dickerson, U.S. Citizen Detained by Mistake Sues MiamiDade
Over
Immigration
Enforcement,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
5,
2017),
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/us/immigration-sanctuary-lawsuit-miami.html.
299.
Complaint for Damages & Declaratory Relief at 12, 15, Creedle v.
Gimenez, No. 1:17-cv-22477-KMW (S.D. Fla. filed July 5, 2017); Dickerson, supra note 298.
300.
Complaint for Damages & Declaratory Relief, Creedle v. Gimenez, No.
1:17-cv-22477-KMW (S.D. Fla. filed July 5, 2017).
301.
Id. at 1.
302.
Id. at 9.
303.
Id. at 11.
304.
Id. at 1011.
305.
See Complaint for Damages & Declaratory Relief, supra note 299, at
1112.
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Since detainers are issued by immigration officers, the procedure lacks the
necessary “probable cause determination by a detached and neutral”
magistrate.306 It is indeed only logical that an immigration officer, due to the
basic nature of his position, can hardly be a neutral and detached
adjudicator.307 For the alleged violations perpetrated against him, Creedle is
seeking compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees and costs, and any additional
equitable relief deemed appropriate by the court.308 The absence of probable
cause, added to the often nonexistent presence of an arrest warrant, exposes
Miami-Dade County and its correctional agencies to hypothetically infinite
legal liability, with the costs taken on by taxpayers.309
B.

What Does Federal Defunding Mean for Florida Jurisdictions?

Cities throughout the state risk losing “hundreds of millions of
dollars” in federal funding if found not in compliance with the directives of
the Executive Order.310 However, the exact amount will depend on the
interpretation of the language of the Executive Order and the exact nature of
the targeted grants.311 Summed together, the counties of Palm Beach,
Broward, Miami-Dade, and Monroe received a total of $565 million in grants
from the federal government in 2016 alone.312 The funds are used for
programs in different areas, from education and public health, to
transportation and housing.313 Mayor Gimenez’s choice to retract previous
county policies regarding detainers is likely a response to the threat of losing
hundreds of millions of dollars in federal funding.314 In fact, “Miami-Dade
County is due to receive $355 million” in federal government money that the
county cannot afford to lose.315 In an effort to explain the rationale behind
the choice made, Gimenez affirmed that losing federal funding to keep
implementing restrictions on detainer requests is not worth the risk.316 And
although Mayor Gimenez’s choice to retract county policies is
306.
Id. at 10, 12.
307.
Id. at 10.
308.
Id. at 14.
309.
Id. at 5, 7–8.
310.
Persaud, supra note 272.
311.
See id.
312.
Id.
313.
Id.
314.
See Serafin Gomez, Miami-Dade Mayor Orders Jails to Comply with
Detention Requests After Trump’s ‘Sanctuary City’ Crackdown, FOX NEWS: POL. (Jan. 27,
2017),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/01/27/miami-dade-mayor-orders-jails-tocomply-with-detention-requests-after-trumps-sanctuary-city-crackdown.html; Sanchez et al.,
supra note 17.
315.
See Gomez, supra note 314.
316.
See Pazmino et al., supra note 60; Sanchez et al., supra note 17.
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understandable under the circumstances, it is exactly the type of coerced
reaction the Constitution protects against.317
VI.

CONCLUSION

Judge William H. Orrick III of the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California issued a court order granting a motion for
nationwide injunction of section 9(a) of the Executive Order.318 After being
requested to revisit the Order in light of the Attorney General’s
memorandum clarifying the language of the Executive Order, Judge Orrick
confirmed the injunction, leaving President Trump with a difficult task:
Solve immigration problems and appease the electorate without infringing
upon constitutional rights and principles.319 The power of states to
implement and enforce their own laws is one of the cornerstones of
American democracy.320 Compelling states, counties, municipalities, and
other local jurisdictions into enforcing federal immigration laws threatens the
system’s balance, and violates the Constitution so dear to most.321
The independence of state and local jurisdictions has been
established by the Founding Fathers in hopes of a new, better world,
distinguishing itself from the crooked, corrupted, oppressive Motherland.322
Centralization of power is a dangerous threat to democracy, and risks
shifting constitutional balances to a direction of no return.323 The question
that should be asked is whether we, as a democracy, prefer independent,
empowered, knowledgeable, competent, engaged, and accountable local
governments and representatives ruling over us, or a distant, centralized,
controlling federal government.324 In promoting the ratification of the
Constitution, James Madison affirmed that:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the
[F]ederal [G]overnment are few and defined. Those which are to
remain in the State [G]overnments are numerous and indefinite.
317.
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); Sanchez et al.,
supra note 17.
318.
Order Granting the County of Santa Clara’s & City & County of San
Francisco’s Motions, supra note 97, at 1, 29–30.
319.
Id. at 25, 30; see also Dan Levine, Judge Refuses to Remove Block on
Trump Sanctuary City Order, REUTERS: POL. (July 20, 2017, 7:15 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-ruling-idUSKBN1A531K.
320.
See Printz, 521 U.S. at 928.
321.
See id. at 920–21.
322.
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012);
Printz, 521 U.S. at 920–21.
323.
See Printz, 521 U.S. at 928–29.
324.
See id.
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The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as
war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce . . . . The powers
reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which,
in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and
properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and
prosperity of the State.325

The right answer may have indeed been given by James Madison in
his promotion of the Constitution, on January 26, 1788.326 Although an
injunction is currently in place, there still exists a real possibility that the
Attorney General, Secretary of State, and President Trump may enforce the
stated intent of the Executive Order to the detriment of states and localities
around the country, including within Florida.327 “[H]undreds of millions of
dollars” in federal grants could be taken away, to the disadvantage of the
people in communities that rely upon the funding.328 Clarification—by the
courts or the President himself—of the federal funds involved and the
sanctuary jurisdictions that will be impacted needs to be made clear, so that
states can make rational and knowledgeable decisions as to whether to
comply with the Executive Order.329

325.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 205, at 262 (James Madison).
326.
See id.; THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 293 (James Madison) (Project
Gutenberg ed.).
327.
See Complaint for Damages & Declaratory Relief, supra note 299, at 1;
Order on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 292, at 9; Levine, supra note 319.
328.
See Persaud, supra note 272.
329.
See Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note 143, at 1,
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